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THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S OFFICE, 
TRADITION, AND CONVICTION 
Charles Fried* 
 
CHARLES FRIED:  Good morning. 
Having read the remarkably detailed and deeply analytic papers by Sai 
Prakash and Dan Meltzer,1 I will not try to compete with them.  What I will 
do is offer myself as an exhibit.  Our subject is the Solicitor General’s duty 
to defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress, even though—and, 
actually, the issue arises only when—the Solicitor General himself or 
herself or the Administration in which he is an officer finds the policy and 
perhaps the reasoning of that statute uncongenial, to say the least.  That has 
become an acute and somewhat comical aspect of the DOMA2 litigation. 
I should really start by saying I think DOMA is clearly unconstitutional.  
I don’t know about the equal protection grounds.  I’m of two minds about 
that.  But it’s perfectly clear to me that on federalism grounds it’s far out of 
line, intruding on traditional state prerogatives to define and regulate family 
relations, and will go down the tubes.  That is my prediction. 
But what’s anomalous about this particular event is the, I think, quite 
unjustified decision of the Obama Justice Department and the Solicitor 
General’s Office not further to defend DOMA.  It should be noted that at 
the time there was no Solicitor General, only an Acting Solicitor General, 
whose position was not subject to Senate confirmation.  On the other side, 
we have one of the ablest former solicitors general, Paul Clement—and we 
all saw just how able he was in the course of this week3—engaged by the 
House of Representatives, to defend DOMA as a private attorney and being 
more or less forced out of a very lucrative partnership at King & Spalding 
because he was doing that.  If you read the explanations of King & 
Spalding, they are about as lame as the explanations in the mandate case by 
the Heritage Foundation in their amicus brief explaining why the fact that 
 
*  Beneficial Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  He served as U.S. Solicitor General 
from 1985 to 1989.  His remarks, delivered on March 30, 2012, have been lightly edited and 
augmented. 
  1. Professors Prakash and Meltzer also presented at the Fordham Law Review’s 
Symposium, Defense of Marriage Act:  Law, Policy and the Future of Marriage, on March 
30, 2012. Professor Prakash’s submission is published in this issue, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
553 (2012). 
  2.  Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
  3. The constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
was being argued before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of this Symposium.  
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they had proposed this twenty years ago doesn’t mean that they really agree 
with it.4 
What sets this up is the kind of drama Washington loves. 
Every Solicitor General—and, of course, there was no Solicitor General 
at the time the decision not to defend was made—goes through a little   
dance at the end of his or her confirmation hearings.  I vividly recall having 
gone through it myself.  It was a perfectly pleasant occasion, my 
confirmation hearing, with Senator Strom Thurmond, who was then a 
vigorous 92, I believe [audience laughter], in the Chair.  At the end of the 
hearings, there was an absolutely canonical interchange: 
“And, Mr. Fried, if confirmed, do you undertake to defend the 
constitutionality of acts of Congress?” 
“Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do, unless no colorable argument can be made in 
their defense or unless they trench on the prerogatives of the executive 
branch.” 
Every Solicitor General in recent times has gone through that particular 
ritual.  Rituals like that—you do actually speak under oath—are taken with 
various degrees of seriousness.  The Attorney General and Deputy Attorney 
General in the Watergate fiasco had promised not to fire the Independent 
Counsel during their confirmation hearings.  They took these undertakings 
seriously enough that they resigned their offices, leaving it to Bob Bork to 
fire Archie Cox.  These things are taken seriously.  As I say, no Solicitor 
General had made that decision not to defend DOMA, and therefore had not 
really gone against an undertaking made under oath. 
We certainly took the duty to defend seriously and the lawyers in my 
office took it seriously.  I’m going to tell war stories, because that’s my 
role.  I’m perfectly capable of analysis, but I’m not going to indulge in it. 
I remember vividly the case of Bowen v. Kendrick,5 which I’m not sure 
any of you remember.  It had to do with the Adolescent and Family Life 
Act.6  Among its provisions was a provision giving federal support to 
organizations which engaged in teaching adolescents about the importance 
of abstinence prior to marriage—this is perhaps related to our topic, but 
distantly—as a way of avoiding teenage pregnancy.7  The Act contained a 
provision which specifically said that monies must be made available to 
religiously related organizations.8 
 
  4.  Brief of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Judicial Education Project, Reason 
Foundation, The Individual Rights Foundation, The Heritage Foundation, Ending Spending, 
Inc., and Former Senators George LeMieux and Hank Brown as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents (Minimum Coverage Provision Issue), U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Florida, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
  5.  487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
  6.  42 U.S.C. § 300z (2006). 
  7.  § 300z-5. 
  8. Although the Adolescent and Family Life Act does not explicitly require grants to 
religious organizations, the importance of grants to religious organizations is emphasized 
throughout the Act, and all grant applicants must describe the involvement of religious 
organizations in their program. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 606–08; see also § 300z–5(a)(21)(B).  
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The implementation of the Act produced lots and lots of evidence of nuns 
in the basements of churches, beautifully decorated with Guido Reni 
portraits of Christ or crucifixes and so on, preaching the importance of 
chastity and abstinence prior to marriage.  This was a bit of an offense to 
some of the people in the ACLU, who made the mistake of turning the issue 
over to the abortion rights division of the ACLU instead of the separation-
of-church-and-state division.  Unfortunately, it was not well done. 
However, I’m getting ahead of the story.  In the Solicitor General’s 
Office, we felt a certain consternation about this Act because it had been 
struck down below.  It was now in the Supreme Court, and it fell to us to 
defend it.  That was very hard to do, particularly on the record, parts of 
which I have described to you. 
Indeed, in the office this case went by the nickname—“the Jesse Helms 
chastity belt statute”—Jesse Helms was one of the Act’s sponsors.   
I  remember getting a call from Senator Helms saying, “Mr. Fried, I 
understand that you’re thinking of not defending my statute.” 
I was able—and I’ll tell you in a moment why I was able—to draw 
myself up to my full 5'4",9 or whatever it is, and say to him over the phone, 
“Senator, I have given an undertaking to defend the constitutionality of 
Acts of Congress, and we shall do our duty.” 
But I said this with such confidence only because of a wonderful 
assistant in my office—some of you may know him—Larry Robbins, who, 
after he left, set up his own extremely successful law firm in Washington, 
Robbins, Russell—an absolutely marvelous man, who didn’t have any, how 
should I say, inherited or acquired sympathy for this particular provision.  
But he was a very good lawyer and he saw that it was his duty as a good 
lawyer to try to work his way through this. 
He said, “You know, Charles, you realize that those people have brought 
a facial challenge?”  We were very friendly and informal in that office—
Larry had been my student.  I had taught him contracts.  I had taught Randy 
Barnett too, but as I explained to the Senate, I didn’t teach him 
Constitutional Law.  Larry Tribe did that. 
And you know what a facial challenge is.  A facial challenge says that 
there is no possible state of facts under which this could be constitutional.  
Of course, that made all the wonderful testimony about the nuns in the 
basement of St. Margaret’s Church and so on quite irrelevant. 
With that under our belt—and Larry actually argued the case—I quite 
confidently answered Senator Helms’s inquiry. 
It’s not always that easy.  The judgment has to be that you have said no 
colorable argument—I didn’t encounter any cases where there was no 
colorable argument.  And that gave trouble because there were in my time, 
and Rex Lee’s time in the office, cases under the federalism rubric which 
were very important to my administration.  They were as important to my 
administration as DOMA is to this administration. 
 
  9.  Professor Fried is actually 6'2".—Ed.  
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That had been the history.  Poor Rex Lee had taken the duty to which he 
had committed himself under oath very seriously.  After Usery,10 it fell to 
Rex to defend the age discrimination statute in Gregory v. Ashcroft,11 
aspects of surface mining in Hodel,12 and the Garcia13 decision.  He was 
bitterly criticized by his colleagues in the administration for doing that. 
Similar issues arose for me.  The two cases were South Dakota v. Dole14 
and South Carolina v. Baker,15 both of which raised important questions of 
state sovereignty.  By the way, President Reagan had signed into law both 
of the statutes involved there.  I remember the counselor to the Attorney 
General, who liked to speak in Napoleonic phrases, saying to me, “I 
understand you have to do this, but, Charles, pas trop de zèle.” 
We won both of those cases, in each case with only one dissent on the 
federalism point, and that was Justice O’Connor.16  I believe we defended 
them quite zealously.  Why?  Because we’re lawyers, and we’re lawyers for 
the government.  You take that seriously.  It’s in your DNA.  That, I think, 
is what Dan and Sai will perform molecular and other analysis upon. 
Thank you very much. 
 
  10.  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
  11.  501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
  12.  Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
  13.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
  14.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
  15.  485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
  16.  Justice Brennan also dissented in South Dakota v. Dole. See 483 U.S. at 212. 